Plan B, Part III

Last time we checked in with our foreign policy experts, our State Department was assuring Iran that we wouldn't be stopping any shipments of arms to Iran's allies in Yemen, the Houthi rebels.  Sure, we're nearing the end of a capitulation, er, negotiation on Iran's nuclear program that might give someone second thoughts about the value of any deal.  And sure, there was a UN resolution we'd pushed for that prohibited arming the Houthis.  And sure, we were moving warships (including an aircraft carrier!) toward a convoy of Iranian vessels thought to be carrying a shipment of arms destined for Yemen, but our State Department wanted to make sure everyone understood that we're all bark and no bite.  As Spokeswoman Marie Harf explained:  I want to be very clear just so that no one has the wrong impression. They are not there to intercept Iranian ships."  Oh.  Why are they there then?  "The purpose of moving them is only to ensure that the shipping lanes remain open and safe."

Today's blog won't rehash the many ways in which this is both depressing and hilarious.  (But click here if you'd like to.)  In any event, it appears that the Iranians didn't believe the stated commerce-protecting purpose of warships.  Perhaps they believed the much less pacific message from the Pentagon instead.  The Iranian ships turned around and headed for home.  If the Iranians did in fact turn around because of the US Navy, it's despite our State Department's behavior, not because of it.  But let's move on to see how we're doing with our stated goal of protecting the shipping lanes.

On Friday, (one day after the Iranian arms shipments turned around for home), Iran's navy intercepted a US-flagged cargo ship in the Strait of Hormuz, the Maersk Kensington.  After encircling and following for a time, the Iranians dispersed.  Yesterday, Iranian navy fired on and seized another cargo ship, the Maersk Tigris.  That ship is headed to port under Iranian escort.

Iran had not been in the habit of using its navy to block shipping lanes until immediately after our President and State Department made a point of saying we'd protect the shipping lanes.  I don't pretend to know if it's immediately possible to protect the cargo ships intercepted over the past 5 days, and I'd guess that Iran chose targets a little removed from the center of US naval presence in the region.  But it's as if Iran is making a point, no?

Which brings us back to Plan B theory.  Our President has publicly stated that he has no alternative to a deal with Iran.  He has no Plan B.  Iran will get what it wants in terms of nuclear militarization development because our lead negotiator, the President of the United States, believes there is no alternative.  He has said so, publicly.  His determination to get a deal at any cost, despite missed deadlines by Iran, despite Twitter (!) accusations by his counterpart of lying, cheating and general infidelitude, despite intentional military provocations during negotiations, confirms his desperation.  

If you get your opponent on the ropes, keep punching hard until he's down.

Plan B, cont.

Iran's march to regional domination is in the news again, as it will be for the foreseeable future. 

Yemen's government crumbled and dissolved into nothingness in January, four months after President Obama touted Yemen as an example of the success of his foreign policy.  Yemen has been in a Hobbesian state of war of all against all since then.

The Yemeni government was reasonably friendly to the US.  Not satisfied with the removal of US influence, Iran is attempting to ensure that Yemen becomes an Iranian puppet state.  A shipment of Iranian arms destined for the Houthis (Iran's allies in Yemen) is on its way.

A prior post examined the disaster that has resulted from having no Plan B in the negotiations with Iran over Iran's nuclear weapons program.  We still have no Plan B there, so even though Iran is actively pursuing military options against US interests in the Middle East (we've been assisting the Saudis in their military actions against Iran's Yemeni allies), we're not even going to pause negotiations.  White House spokesman Josh Earnest:  Iran's intervention "is not a reason to break up those negotiations — in fact, it is a very strong incentive for those negotiations to succeed."  Most experienced negotiators do not take threats, violence or other bad behavior as a reason to come to agreement.  The proper response to someone pounding the table across from you is not to agree with him in the hope that he'll stop the scary noises.  The proper response is to call his bluff.  But our negotiators seem invincible to experience.

On Sunday, the US diverted warships to the Yemeni coast.  Maybe we did learn how to call a bluff?  No.  Since Sunday, there have been a series of statements from the Obama administration, including Obama himself, that could not be better crafted to communicate confusion, weakness and irrelevance.

After his Press Secretary told reporters that the United States "is serious about the Iranians not providing weapons to the Houthis," President Obama said these words to Chris Mathews in an interview on MSNBC:

"Right now their ships are in international waters.  There’s a reason why we keep some of our ships in the Persian Gulf region and that is to make sure we maintain freedom of navigation. And what we’ve said to them is if there are weapons delivered to factions within Yemen that could threaten navigation, that’s a problem."

Let that sink in.  There's a UN resolution prohibiting anyone from arming the Houthis.  The White House Press Secretary has reiterated that we're serious about preventing Iran from arming the Houthis.  So to ensure that everyone understand our intentions, President Obama says that we're concerned with the shipping lanes.  If Mathews wasn't distracted by his tingling leg, perhaps he would have thought to ask what problem a weapons shipment could possibly create for maritime navigation.

Mr. President, there is no problem with the shipping lanes.  None.  The idea that weapons being delivered to Yemen could "threaten navigation" is intentional idiocy.  The weapons are to be used in Yemen, against our allies.  It's as if the FBI set up armed surveillance of a gun trafficking operation in a Walmart parking lot, for the sole purpose of ensuring that the traffickers didn't use any of the handicapped parking spaces.

For its part, the State Department wants to make sure we all understand that US warships aren't going to do anything, you know, warlike.  Spokeswoman Marie Harf:  "I want to be very clear just so that no one has the wrong impression. They are not there to intercept Iranian ships.  The purpose of moving them is only to ensure that the shipping lanes remain open and safe."

This is impossible to parody.  We're sending our warships toward an Iranian shipment of weapons, not to intercept those weapons, but to make sure they reach their destination safely. 

Plan B

This is a post about Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Obama, but will take a bit of a detour first, so stick with me.

One of my primary jobs as a lawyer has been negotiation.  We want this, they want that, and sometimes, we and they can come together for a deal that makes both parties better off.  A deal won't happen unless both parties to the deal think that they're better off with the deal than without the deal.  If the deal makes someone worse off, then that someone will just refuse the deal.  Simple as that.

But a deal can still be a lot better for one side than for the other.  If there are 100 new benefits arising from a deal, sometimes Winner Corp. gets 99, and Loser, Inc. gets just 1.  Why would Loser, Inc. settle for so little, you ask?  It depends, always, on Plan B.  Plan B is Loser's back up plan, its next best option if it can't work out a deal with Winner.  For example, let's say Loser is in financial trouble, and expects that if it doesn't find some larger company to acquire it by this time next year, it will have to file bankruptcy.  So Loser starts to try to find a buyer.  If Loser finds two or more potential buyers, then it has an opportunity to create a good Plan B--an offer from one of the buyers will be Plan B, and the other buyer will have to beat it to make a deal.  But if Loser finds only one potential buyer, then bankruptcy becomes Plan B, and the one buyer can acquire Loser for nearly nothing; $1 is better than bankruptcy.

I said negotiations depend on Plan B.  That's not quite specific enough.  Negotiations depend on each side's perceptions of Plan B, both their own Plan B, and the other side's Plan B.  If Loser's perception of its own Plan B is that it's better than what Winner is offering, Loser won't make a deal with Winner until Winner sweetens its offer.  On the other hand, if Winner thinks that Loser's Plan B is a disaster for Loser, Winner will stick to a low ball offer and expect that Loser will have to take it, sooner or later.  But if Winner thinks that there's another buyer involved, that is, Loser has a valuable Plan B, then Winner will reconsider its low ball offer.  This is, in essence, what people mean by bargaining power--if Winner has other good options, but Loser's Plan B is an ugly mess, then Loser is going to be willing to give away almost everything to make a deal with Winner.

Last week, President Obama announced a "historic understanding" with Iran, and the State Department released a fact sheet list of "parameters" composing that understanding.  Whether State's parameters do or do not achieve the UN goal of ending Iranian nuclear weapons activities, the most interesting fact for Plan B analysis is the fact of the announcement by President Obama in light of the reaction by Supreme Leader Khamenei.  Khamenei tweeted that State's fact sheet was "contrary to what was agreed", that it was unclear whether talks would lead to a deal, that "no deal" is preferable to a deal contrary to Iran's interests, and attacked the American negotiators as liars, deceivers and promise-breachers.

Take the names and subject matter away from the negotiation, and look at the dynamic:

"Hey, listen up!  After long negotiations, we've finally agreed!  Here's the list of terms, we just need to work out minor details!  This is a great day!"

"No we haven't.  We didn't agree to any of that.  I don't know if we're agreeing or not, ever.  Besides, it's difficult to discuss things with a lying cheat such as yourself."

Tell me, which one has a Plan B that he's not terrified of?  Which Winner is getting 99 out of 100?

You might say that Khamenei is a clever man, and knows the value of making people think he has a good Plan B, and that Obama has a terrible Plan B.  You might be right--Khamenei may be more eager for a deal than he seems.  But for negotiations, the perception of Plan B is what matters.  And Obama has managed to become perceived as desperate for a deal, even going so far as to publicly paint himself into a corner by claiming his only Plan B is a war he finds unacceptable.  If Obama were to intentionally eliminate his negotiating leverage, he couldn't do a better job.